"Global alternatives, regional stability and common causes": the international politics of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and its relationship to the West by Aris, S & Snetkov, A
1 
 “Global alternatives, regional stability and common causes”: the 
international politics of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization 
and its relationship to the West. 
 
Dr Stephen Aris, Center for Security Studies, ETH Zurich 




Two scholars of the international relations of Eurasia consider the “geopolitical identity” of the 
Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). They firstly outline that most of the existing 
analysis and comment on the SCO assumes its raison d’etre to be countering the “West” in 
Eurasia and beyond, and suggest that this narrow perspective does not afford the SCO enough 
agency, which leads to a distorted picture of the variety of SCO discourse and behavior. 
Secondly, they outline a framework, based on a combination of the literatures on Critical 
Geopolitics and identity-focused International Relations, for examining the “geopolitical 
identity” of the SCO. The article then traces the SCO’s geopolitical discourse on its own 
collective identity, its relationship to the West in wider international affairs, Eurasia and in areas 
in which it seeks active collaboration with the West. It is argued that while in many contexts 
the SCO’s geopolitical discourse is indeed built upon a Self-Other dynamic that contrasts their 
common positions on certain international issues against those of the West, in others it identifies 







The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) has been gaining increasing international 
visibility since its establishment in 2001. Its membership of Russia, China, and four post-Soviet 
Central Asian Republics (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan), as well as 
Afghanistan, India, Iran, Mongolia and Pakistan as observer states, has led it to be considered 
a significant actor within the wider Eurasian space. In spite of its membership and predominant 
focus on Eurasia, the majority of characterizations of the SCO - in both the existing literature 
and in the media - are that it is predominately defined by a desire to counter the West.1  
While there is a growing literature on the SCO, little attention has been paid to the 
SCO’s geopolitical discourse, or “geopolitical imagination” (Agnew, 2003). 2  Hence, to a 
certain extent, the depiction of the SCO as counterpoised to the West is based on a one-sided 
reading of its relevance to the West’s “geopolitical imagination”. Further, this view is based on 
the assumptions of a traditional geopolitical perspective, which Agnew refers to as the “modern 
geopolitical imagination” (Agnew, 2003), whereby “states are in an unremitting competition 
with one another for primacy” (Agnew, 2010a, p. 572). Due to its membership, many 
commentators have deduced that it is logical that the SCO must be defined by a desire to 
challenge the West. In the last decade, China has been characterized as an “emerging 
superpower”, whose rise is likely to alter the prevailing global balance-of-power. During the 
same period, Russia has expressed an ambition to be recognized as a “great power” (Neumann, 
2008; Tsygankov, 2005; Adomeit, 1995) and is considered a state with a long history of 
competition with the West. Hence, it has be concluded that an organization containing these 
two actors must be driven by an agenda of undermining the prevailing hegemonic position of 
the US, and the West at large, within the international system.  
To examine the SCO’s various spatial and normative identity constructions, and the role 
that its perception of the “West” plays to this end, this article draws on the literatures of 
Self/Other identity relationships (Morozov and Rumelili, 2012; Prozorov, 2012; Epstein, 2011; 
Suzuki, 2007; Neumann, 1999; Campbell, 1998; Neumann, 1996), critical geopolitics (Dalby, 
2008; Paasi, 2006; Agnew, 2003; Ó Tuathail, 1996; Ó Tuathail, and Agnew, 1992; Dalby, 1991) 
and the emerging literature on the interjection between regional studies in political geography 
                                                 
1 The term “Western” has come under increasing interrogation in recent years, particularly with regard to the discussion about the division 
between Western and non-Western IR. In this paper, however, the question of the West is approached from the point of view of the existing 
literature on the SCO that itself tends to labels this particular regional organisation as “anti-Western” as will be outlined in the review literature. 
Therefore the point of departure is to examine whether this is indeed the way in which the SCO itself constructs itself and its Others. For a 
greater discussion of the “West” as opposed to the “non-West” see: Acharya, 2011; Hutchings, 2011; Acharya and Buzan, 2010; Tickner and 
Waever, 2009; Bilgin, 2008; Tickner, 2003.  
2 Ambrosio (2009; 2008) has examined the norms and discourse articulated by the SCO in relation to democracy. 
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and contemporary geopolitics (Popescu, 2008; Prozorov, 2007; Glassman, 2005; Toal, 2003; 
Kaplan and Hakly, 2002). It traces how the SCO’s geopolitical discourse, or identity, on 
international/regional affairs is built upon a Self-Other dynamic with regard to the West. In this 
paper, Self/Other constructs are seen as composed of three broad types, the discourse on the 
Self from within, the Other as similar/different, and the Other as an opposite, while 
acknowledging that in practice these analytical divisions are blurred. It is argued that with 
regard to certain spaces and issues the SCO seeks to construct an in-group among its members 
by contrasting their common positions against those of the West. However, in others it seeks to 
build a larger in-group with the West.  
This paper thus bears out the view that the West plays the role of an important 
counterpoint for the SCO and that it often defines itself against the West. However, this is the 
case only in some respects, and in some spaces. In other respects and spaces the West does not 
play such a role, and indeed is sometimes constructed as a similar, even collaborative, Other. 
Therefore, it is suggested that a more nuanced understanding of the geopolitical identity of the 
SCO is required than that of the prevailing popular characterizations. To this end, the SCO 
should be allowed greater space and agency to define its own geopolitical identity instead of 
being considered only in relation to the West.  
This article firstly surveys the current literature on the SCO, secondly it outlines its basic 
theoretical assumptions about identity and geopolitics, and thirdly, traces the SCO’s 
geopolitical discourse on its own identity, and that of its relationship to the West in terms of 
both Eurasia and the wider international system.  
 
The SCO and Its Geopolitical Discourses 
Ever since its creation in 2001, the SCO has predominately been depicted as an anti-Western 
grouping, created in order to counter-balance the West’s (and particularly the US) influence in 
Eurasia and as a Russian-Chinese driven anti-Western bloc in the wider global space (Ferguson, 
2012; Naarajärvi, 2012; Carroll, 2011; Wilhelmsen and Flikke, 2011). As outlined in the 
introduction, this perspective tends to be shaped by a traditional reading of “geopolitics”, and 
the assumption that states inevitably compete for influence, status and control over resources 
vis-à-vis one another and in terms of their hierarchical position within the international system. 
As Agnew notes “[f]rom this viewpoint, achieving high rates of economic growth will 
automatically translate into an urge for great power at others’ expense  and the anarchy of the 
world beyond state borders makes this task inevitable” (Agnew 2010a, p.572). With the Chinese 
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“economic miracle” continuing apace, and Russia’s openly outlining its desire for “great 
power” status, a lot of analysis of the SCO has taken this perspective. This is perhaps 
unsurprising given that one of founding fathers of “geopolitics” as a school of thought, Halford 
Mackinder, made the case for such a perspective by arguing that the geographical area which is 
roughly proximate to that of the membership of the SCO, represents the “heartland” of world 
geopolitics and the “pivot” of world history (Mackinder, 1904).3  
The existing literature varies in its depiction of the geopolitical orientation of the SCO 
as an actor, and the primacy, and nature, of its perceptions of and relationship to the West. Some 
analysts have viewed the SCO as nothing more than a vehicle to counter the “West”, be that the 
United States (US), North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), European Union (EU).4 Other 
scholars have not characterized the SCO as solely defined by an anti-Western purpose, but have 
emphasized the divergence and clash between the values of the SCO and the West.5 While 
others have set out to examine the SCO in terms of its own regional context, emphasizing that 
its relationship to the West is not integral, but have nonetheless sought to address questions 
about the SCO’s relationship with the West (Aris, 2009; de Haas, 2008; Gene, 2008). Indeed, 
the propensity of the current literature to focus on the SCO as driven and defined by anti-
Westernism has been noted by several scholars.6 The coverage of the SCO in the popular media 
has been even more explicit in depicting it as centered on countering the West.7  
Whilst, the image of the SCO as an aggressive anti-Western actor has softened 
somewhat in recent years, the remnants of these underlying assumptions about the SCO remain. 
This is illustrated by accounts of the SCO’s proclaimed focus on playing a larger role in 
Afghanistan as driven by an attempt to counter-balance NATO in Afghanistan (Fiacconi, 2012), 
rather than as a bid to deal with a common regional security dilemma. Indeed, this tendency to 
consider the SCO as primarily an anti-Western bloc and not a multilateral framework focused 
on issues within its own region, is consistent with broader trends that linger in international 
relations literature and policy analysis. Such analysis tends to interpret non-Western actors’ 
identity constructions and central foci as primarily framed through the binary of their 
                                                 
3 For an analysis of the framing of Central Asia in Western academia, including the role of Mackinder’s “Eurasian Heartland” thesis in this, 
see Heathershaw and Mergoran, 2011; Sengupta, 2009; Heathershaw, 2007; Megoran, 2004. 
4 Cohen (2006) states that the “SCO primarily serves as a geopolitical counterweight to the United States”. While a US Senator proclaimed 
that “SCO is "the most dangerous organisation Americans have never heard of “ and “"a potential Warsaw Pact” (Brownback, 2006) . 
5 Ambrosio outlines that the SCO “represents a formidable challenge to the ideas of universal democracy and human rights through its de facto 
legitimisation of authoritarianism and by establishing itself as a counterweight to external democratic norms” (Ambrosio, 2008, p. 1322). 
While, Bailes and Dunay (2007, p. 13) noted, “up to very recently, analytical writing about the SCO ….[has] liked to stress how far away the 
Organisation actually is from European traditions and norms in its way of dismissing human rights concerns and forbidding mutual ‘interference 
in internal affairs’”. 
6 Hanova argues that “Russian and Chinese interests in the SCO are often reduced to a common objective of anti-Americanism” (2009, p. 80). 
Troitsky states the “Western assessments sometimes view the SCO as increasingly becoming a mechanism to oust the USA and its Western 
allies from Central Asia, and thus to threaten Western security interests” (Troitskii, 2007). 
7 A BBC (2012) report notes it is “widely viewed as a countermeasure to curb the influence of Western alliances, such as Nato”; Sky News 
2008) outlined that “the alliance was established in 2001 to counter NATO influence in the Central Asian region”; Tony Halpin writing in The 
Times noted that it “increasingly regarded by Moscow and Beijing as a counterweight to US global influence”. 
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relationship with the West, or in other words a “non-Western/Western” Self/Other dynamic 
(Agathangelou and Ling 2009; Hobson 2007; Barkawi and Laffey 2006). 
This paper is focused on the SCO’s discourse and attempts to construct geopolitical 
space, and to this end it treats the SCO’s geopolitical discourse as a coherent discourse for 
analytical purposes. However, like all multilateral organizations, the SCO cannot claim to 
present a fully coherent and collective representation of its member-states geopolitical 
perspective and interests. Indeed, as with all collective groupings, the SCO is the subject of 
competing and divergence of voices among its membership. These areas of contention among 
the SCO members have centered on whether it should primarily focus on security or economics 
(see Aris, 2011, pp. 78-83; Bailes and Dunay, 2007, p. 16-17; Oldberg, 2007, p. 28), the depth 
of integration (see Aris 2011, pp.175-7; Bailes and Dunay, 2007; Oldberg, 2007, p. 35; Troitskii 
2007, p.34), and the potential expansion of its membership and the long-term identity of the 
organization (see Aris 2011, pp.164-170; Bailes and Dunay, 2007, p. 19;  Makhmudov, 2007; 
Portyakov, 2007).  
Also, the SCO faces a number of challenges. The effectiveness of the SCO as a model for multilateral 
cooperation has often by questioned due to some of the very concepts and principles it espouses as part of its 
geopolitical discourse, namely non-intervention in domestic affairs. This is exacerbated by the reluctance of some 
of the member states’ regimes to participate in any form of cooperation, let alone integration, which may threaten 
their own sovereign control over all internal policy matters (Aris, 2011; Allison, 2008; Allison, 2004). In 
addition, scholars have highlighted a degree of distrust between some of its members (Bond and Koch, 2010; 
Allison, 2004). Against this background, the effectiveness of the SCO as a force for regional security management 
has been questioned by both Western (Bond and Kuch, 2010; McDermott, 2010; Melvin, 2010; Weitz, 
2010) and regional analysts (Morozov, 2009; Portyakov, 2007; Zhao, 2006). This is due to the SCO’s focus 
on the principle of non-intervention and the lack of both its capacity and willingness to act as a collective 
multilateral actor. The SCO’s model of regional cooperation, while strongly limited in terms of its effectiveness to 
act as an agent for regional security management, is to a large degree consistent with its discursive geopolitical 
vision about what should define the norms, values and standards of international relations. 
Broadly speaking there is less contestation concerning the SCO’s conception of 
geopolitics than in other areas of its agenda. The primary dividing line on geopolitical matters 
has been on the degree to which the SCO should represent itself as a counter-Western actor 
within the international system, with reservations expressed about such a focus among the more 
Western-orientated Central Asian Republics (Aris, 2011, pp. 146-8; Maksutov, 2006, p. 9). 
Notably, Kazakhstan is considered to be concerned that overt anti-Western rhetoric may impact 
on the increasingly investment in Kazakh energy resources by Western companies (Maksutov, 
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2006, 9; Shaimergenov and Tusupbaeva, 2006). 8  However, Moscow’s and, especially, 
Beijing’s9 desire to keep the Central Asian member states engaged in the development of the 
SCO project has led both to refrain from pushing the other states into endorsing statements and 
positions that they strongly oppose, with the exception of the declaration on the Russian-
Georgian War and during the Osh Riots (2010), both of which will be discussed below.10 In this 
way, the reservation of some of members about overt anti-Western comment restricts the scope 
for such discourse within the SCO and provides a check on excessive anti-Western rhetoric. 
Furthermore, all the members have at various times deemed the SCO to be a useful geopolitical 
tool in their own foreign policy. Thus, in spite of certain cases of divergences on particular 
incidents, there has been very little public disagreement with SCO geopolitical statements from 
its own membership and it has been able to put forward a relatively consistent and coherent 
geopolitical vision over the last decade.  
   
Analytical Framework 
To assess the SCO’s geopolitical identity, and the significance of the West in this regard, this 
article adopts an interdisciplinary analytical framework, drawing on insights from both critical 
security studies and critical geopolitics scholars.11 These are utilized to examine the identity 
Self/Other construction of the SCO and its production of geopolitical discourses and practices.  
As outlined by Müller, “adopting a constructivist perspective, critical geopolitics 
examines the very construction and social effects of geopolitical imaginations and geopolitical 
identities - the imaginary spatial positioning of people, regions, states and the shifting 
boundaries that accompany this positioning” (Müller, 2008, p.323). How actors define their 
geopolitical identities, often in relation to what is understood as lying within the “internal” 
space and its differentiation to the “external” space, also defines how they view the nature of 
the wider geopolitical space and their role, place and hierarchical position within it. By 
                                                 
8 This dynamic is interpreted by many as part of the wider context of growing competition for energy resources in Kazakhstan, involving 
primarily Western, Russian and Chinese companies (Pannell, 2011; Marketos, 2009a; Wishnick, 2009). 
9 China’s adoption of a soft power strategy towards the Central Asian Republics has been noted by many scholars, and is consider as aimed at 
“demystifying” the Chinese presence in the region and altering the prevailing negative perception of China within these states (Pannell, 2011; 
Aris, 2009; Pan, 2008). This also includes not being seen as a bully in pushing the Central Asian Republics into making statements that they 
do not wish to. Another dimension to this strategy is said to be gaining access to much-need energy resources from this region. Pannell argues 
that China’s adoption of a “soft power” approach to Central Asia since 1991 is “a tale of increased administrative and military capacity, but 
perhaps more importantly on the other hand, is a matter of expanding economic and diplomatic influence and a good example of the flowering 
of China’s soft approach to the application of power and the success of its diplomacy and commercial thrust. At the same time China has 
serious need for various resources, especially oil, and this too requires attention and analysis to assess its significance” (2011, p. 107/8). This 
increasing mutual-interest and interdependence (Pannell, 2011) in relation to the Central Asian Republics for material needs also encourages 
China not to act overly forcefully towards these states within the SCO. Hence, for example China is competing with Western energy firms for 
contracts in Kazakhstan, which in turn incentivizes Beijing not to push Astana into any statements it feels uncomfortable with regarding the 
West, in order to avoid unnecessarily pressurizing this relationship. 
10 It is also arguable that there was some disagreement over the 2005 Astana Summit Declaration (see Shaimergenov and Tusupbaeva, 2006). 
11 Thus, it bridges the gap between critical geopolitics and critical security studies by putting forward an interdisciplinary analytical framework 
that draws on insights from both these fields of enquiry (also see Dalby, 2010a; 2010b; 2008; Mamadouh and Dijink, 2006). 
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extension, this colors how they view other actors and spaces, which are interpreted in relation 
to the said actor’s reading of how they fit within the international system and in turn reflect 
their “national interests and identities” (Agnew, 2010a, p. 570).  
This tendency to view Others in the world through your own - Self - geopolitical 
imaginary and identity, often leads to misrepresentation of the perspective of the Other. Indeed, 
Self-defined assumptions frame an actor’s reading of the Other according to a filter of 
predetermined biases. Accordingly, this limits the space for the agency of that Other. Such 
tendencies underlie the criticism of much of Western IR and geopolitical analysis of the non-
Western world. Scholars have criticized the Eurocentric, or Westerncentric, viewpoints on the 
non-West, which impose Western assumptions and conceptions onto other contexts in which 
they do not have the same significance, and deny non-Western actors agency by only viewing 
them in terms of their relevance to Western interests (Hobson, 2012; Agathangelou and Ling, 
2009; Bilgin, 2008; Sidaway, 2008; Hobson, 2007; Barkawi and Laffey, 2006; Robinson, 2003).  
For example, as noted by Agnew with reference to Western analysis of China, “it is foreign 
commentators who are especially prone to interpret China’s geopolitical position exclusively 
in terms of Western conventional wisdom” (Agnew, 2010a, p. 572). Taking this into account, 
this paper seeks to examine the SCO’s discourse on geopolitics from this organization’s 
perspective and discourses, rather than simply by imposing objective models or principles from 
outside. 
Starting from this “critical geopolitics” perspective, this article draws on the synergies 
between the assumptions of “critical geopolitics” and “constructivist IR” approaches, in order 
to outline a framework for examining the Self-Other dynamic in the SCO’s geopolitical 
discourse vis-à-vis the West. As Mamadouha and Dijkinka note “critical geopolitics relates 
more clearly to constructivist approaches in international relations (IR), studies focusing on the 
formation of international and security identities and strategic culture” (Mamadouha and 
Dijkinka, 2006, p. 355). Post-positivist IR scholars assert that identity is the product of an 
actor’s understanding of Self and Other, as well as the normative structures of the context in 
which it functions.12 In other words, identity is constructed by an actor’s perceptions of its own 
identity and that of the outside world, including Other actors. The notion of the Other is “an 
epistemological necessity in the definition of the self: the very capacity to experience a self is 
contingent upon otherness; it is in dialogue with others that the self is shaped” (Honneland, 
1998, p. 281). An actor’s perception of the Other(s) thus enables it to distinguish itself from 
                                                 
12 For an up-to-date summary of the debate on identity and the Self/Other dynamics see Morozov and Rumelili, 2012, Prozorov, 2012 and 
Epstein, 2011. 
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Others, by identifying differences between other actors and itself, and also by constructing its 
relationships with these Others within its perceived context (Snetkov, 2010).  
However, as opposed to the conception of identity found in more poststructuralist 
literature (e.g. Mouffe, 2000; Campbell, 1998), this article considers that the Self-Other 
dynamic is not inevitably formed around an antagonistic relationship between the Self and the 
Other. While, an actor constructs its identity in relation to what it perceives its Others to be, the 
nature and identity of this Other is not fixed. Thus, a variety of different constructions of the 
Other and its relationship to the Self are possible. As Hansen (2006, p. 38) argues “less-than-
radical Others” are commonplace, and as noted by Hopf, “identities are always relational, but 
only sometimes oppositional” (Hopf, 2002, p. 7).  
Indeed, this article concurs with the scholars that argue that a range of possible 
constructions of the Other exist (Herschinger, 2012, p. 73; Morozov and Rumelili, 2012; Buzan 
and Waever, 2009, p. 262; Hansen, 2006; Campbell, 1998): These include an oppositional and 
antagonistic Other, seen in direct contrast to the Self; an Other which is seen as different but 
not antagonistic to the Self; or an Other with which the Self sees similarity and with which it 
can construct a common in-group identity (Hansen, 2006). Taking this into account, as 
suggested by Hansen, there is a need for an analytical framework that allows not only for the 
study of “a radically different and threatening Other”, but which also accounts “for degrees of 
difference and Otherness” (2006, p. 38).  
Furthermore, and given the article’s focus on a multilateral actor, the importance of 
collective identity formation that is not automatically centered on the process of Othering is 
asserted, particularly when analyzing processes of identity construction of regional 
organizations. Indeed, drawing on the work of Krasner (1999), Abizadeh makes the distinction 
between two forms of sovereignty and self/other dynamics: sovereignty/control within a 
particular territorial space and sovereignty/control of external borders in relation to other actors 
in the international system. Whilst the latter does indeed delineate spatially between Us and 
Them, the former is centered on sovereignty/identity building drawn from within a particular 
space that does not per se need to be constructed on an explicit Self/Other dynamic (Abizadeh, 
2005, pp. 49-50).  
This is an aspect of collective identity building that is now an accepted feature in the 
study of the EU and its identity building processes,13 and is increasingly also being recognized 
with regard to the study of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) via the notion 
                                                 
13 For a more extensive discussion on this see Morozov and Rumelili, 2012; Prozorov, 2011; Manners, 2006; Diez, 2004; 2005; Rumelili, 2004; 
Waever, 1995. 
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of the “ASEAN-way” (Acharya, 2001). However, analysis of the SCO has continued to 
downplay this aspect of collective identity building within the SCO itself, and has instead, as 
noted above, emphasized its function as a counterbalance to the West. Against this background, 
this article argues that in contrast to a lot of existing analysis of “non-Western” regional 
organizations, it is necessary to recognize the agency of non-Western actors. Firstly, in terms of  
their capacity to construct their own view and position towards the Other. Secondly, in their 
ability to construct their collective identity according to local dynamics that are not directly 
constructed through their relationship with the West. 
Finally, this article asserts that an actor does not have a single fixed identity, including 
in terms of a Self/Other dynamic. Rather, identity construction functions across a wide-range 
of spatial, temporal and issue contexts, and are not necessarily the same in all. In this respect, 
this paper rejects the more mainstream definition of identity (Wendt, 1992) as “essentially self-
sameness, or what makes an object unique” and “involves assumptions about stability over time 
– a self or object is assumed to have a stable, unchangeable essence or core” (Ortmann, 2008, 
p. 51). Instead, identity constructions are on-going processes and in constant evolution, 
emphasizing “the fluidity and contextual nature of identities” (Abdelal et al, 2006, p. 697). 
Whereas, much of the current literature on geopolitical discourses and identity constructions 
focus on a single strand or dimension of the Self/Other dynamic, this perspective suggests that 
is necessary to take into account the variety of spatial discourses and positionalities that exist 
in different contexts and on different issues and aspects of relationships. As noted by Morozov 
and Rumelili “positive and negative representations of the Other can coexist and be projected 
upon different aspects of the Other’s identity” (Morozov and Rumelili, 2012, p. 31) Therefore, 
multiple strands of identity constructions and processes of othering are possible within the same 
corpus of geopolitical discourse. Hence, we proceed from “an understanding of the degree to 
which all states ….. must necessarily adjust in practice to a world politics in constant evolution 
and not just of their making” (Agnew, 2010a, p. 575). 
Against this background, the question of whether or not the SCO is an anti-Western 
organization is not an easy one to answer, nor is it easy to characterize the nature of the Self/Other 
dynamic between the SCO and the West as based on a single identity construction. In practice, 
as outlined below, the answer varies depending on which particular strand of the SCO’s 
geopolitical discourse one examines. Taking this into account, the next section surveys the 
SCO’s geopolitical discourse with regard to its Self, and the West as its primary Other, across 
the full range of spatial and issue-areas in which this Self-Other dynamic is active.  
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The SCO’s geopolitical discourses14 through the Self/Other 
dynamic 
 
A collective identity: the formation of an in-group among the SCO members 
 
In contrast to the majority of characterizations of its identity in existing analysis, officials within 
the SCO seek to communicate that the SCO is primarily concerned with the building of an in-
group among its member-states. The SCO Charter states that “the main goals and tasks of SCO 
are: to strengthen mutual trust, friendship and good neighborliness between the member States’, 
including the “search of common positions on foreign policy issues of mutual interest, including 
issues arising within international organizations and international fora” and that it is “not 
directed against other States and international organizations” (Charter of the Shanghai 
Cooperation Organization 2002). Highlighting this aim, Vladimir Putin outlined in 2006 that 
“[at a time] when statements about ostensibly insuperable cultural and civilizational divides 
between states are reviving, the Organization [SCO] offers an excellent example of an equal 
rights partnership in Eurasia” (Putin, 2006). In 2007, the SCO member states signed a “Treaty 
on Long-Term Good-Neighborliness, Friendship and Cooperation Between the Member States 
of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization”, which as well as emphasizing the coordination 
among its members, also sought to reemphasize that the SCO is “not be directed against any 
States or organizations, and that the Contracting Parties shall follow the principle of openness 
to the other countries of the world” (Treaty on Long-Term Good-Neighbourliness, Friendship 
and Cooperation Between the Member States of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, 2007).  
It has been argued that the basis for such an intra-regional focus has grown since the 
second half of the 2000s. Although the SCO’s record of implementing its economic agenda is 
patchy, its member states have at least begun to realize the potential mutual economic benefits 
from a closer and more coordinated relationship (Aris 2011; Portyakov 2007; Chung 2006). In 
this respect, an important dynamic has been the growth in Chinese, and to a much lesser extent 
Russian, investment in the Central Asian Republics. This Chinese investment is seen as driven 
by its need for greater energy resources (Pannell, 2011; Marketos, 2009b; Sheives, 2006), while 
both Russia and China hope to establish their influence in the region in the face of growing 
competition from other external powers (Bailes and Dunay, 2007; Oldberg, 2007). From the 
Central Asian leaderships’ perspective, their states are, to varying extents, dependent on foreign 
                                                 
14 The main methods by which the SCO seeks to express its views on the international stage are by the issuing of statements with regard to 
international events, and more importantly the common declarations issued at the annual summit meetings of the Heads of State. 
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investments, and such investment is considered as valuable for stabilizing their states and thus 
the security of their regimes, as long as it does not threaten their sovereign control over their 
national economy (Aris, 2011; Allison, 2004). In 2006 China offered $900 million to SCO 
member states in the form of preferential buyer’s credit for Chinese exports. While in the wake 
of the 2008 financial crisis, China made $10 billion of loans available to support economic 
cooperation. Furthermore, both Moscow and Beijing are seen as the driving force behind the 
idea of creating an SCO “Energy Club”, seen by many in the context of growing competition 
over access and the direction of energy pipelines (Frolenkov, 2008; Oldberg, 2007; Troitskii, 
2007).  
Hence, in recent years the emphasis on developing mutual economic interests and 
interdependence between the SCO member states has increased. For example, in relation to the 
burgeoning Chinese-Kazakhstan relationship on energy, which is seen as conditioned by a 
background of direct competition with the growing engagement of Western energy companies 
in Kazakhstan during recent years, 15  Pannell notes that from a Chinese perspective this 
represents “a strategic as well as practical response to this growing demand and necessity for 
China’s rapidly growing economy. It also serves to further intensify China’s economic ties to 
Kazakhstan in such a way that creates mutual benefits but also some increased dependency” 
(Pannell, 2011, p. 111). Although, economic cooperation is mainly limited to energy and large-
scale infrastructural projects16 and predominately restricted in implementation by concerns over 
maintaining economic sovereignty17, it has nonetheless contributed to a Eurasian context which 
is, to at least some extent, more conducive to the development of intra-regional identity within 
the SCO. 
As well as highlighting that it is focused on intra-regional matters, the SCO does express 
the aim of becoming a voice in wider international affairs. The 2006 SCO summit declaration 
outlines that the “SCO member states will continue to strengthen coordination and cooperation 
in international and regional affairs and take a common position on matters involving SCO's 
interests” (Declaration on the Fifth Anniversary of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, 
2006; Joint Communiqué of Meeting of the Council of the Heads of the Member States of the 
Shanghai Cooperation Organization, 2006). In relation to this, the SCO asserts that its views on 
international relations are primarily driven by dynamics from within its regional context and its 
                                                 
15 For more on recent development in Kazakhstan’s relationship with Western companies investments see Weitz, 2012; Kilner 2012 
16 Russia, and to a lesser extent the Central Asian Republics, seek to keep economic cooperation in the SCO limited to large-scale infrastructural  
projects, and are reluctant to engage in negotiations for creating an SCO free trade, which is seen as a long-term Chinese aim. From the Russian 
perspective, this reluctance is due to a fear that it will lose economic influence in the region in open competition with China, and thus prefers 
to keep micro-economic cooperation within the EurAsEC and Single Economic Space projects (Aris, 2011; Bailes and Dunay, 2007; Oldberg, 
2007).  
17 The Central Asian Republics are concerned that if China is allowed too much access to their economies then they will overwhelmed by the 
size and competitive advantages of the Chinese economy. 
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sense of Self, rather than being fundamentally defined by a competitive dynamic vis-à-vis the 
West. 
 The SCO’s discourse on international affairs is therefore often directly related to the 
specifics of the Eurasian context and the interests of its member states. The SCO has thus 
proclaimed itself to be focused on responding to the problems dominating the region, such as 
what it has labeled as the “three evils” that have beset the region: terrorism, separatism and 
extremism (Shanghai Convention on Combating Terrorism, Separatism and Extremism, 2001). 
However, the SCO’s inaction in response to a request for external assistance by the interim 
Kyrgyz government during the Osh riots in 201018 has focused attention on the capacity of the 
SCO to intervene in regional security crises (Aris, 2012; Bond and Koch, 2010). Nonetheless, 
in its geopolitical discourse the SCO has continued to emphasize the importance of a focus on 
regional security, with its 2011 Astana summit declaration noting that “the tasks of fighting 
against terrorism, separatism and extremism remain the key priorities for the SCO (Astana 
Declaration of the 10th Anniversary of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, 2011). 
According to a number of scholars, a shift in the approach to the “three evils” is evident 
between the early period after the formation of the SCO, in which it was primarily centered on 
countering the threat of extremist, separatist and opposition groups conducting terrorist 
operations, and the second half of the 2000s onwards, since when this remit has been expanded 
to include any dynamic seen as agitating against the existing regimes due to the experience of 
the “color revolutions” (Allison, 2008; Ambrosio, 2008; Lanteigne, 2006/7). The focus placed 
on addressing challenges within the region is often related to ensuring that this concentration 
on the Self is not undermined by the actions of extra-regional actors within Eurasia. This is 
reflected in its discourse on international affairs, which both seeks to signal that it is driven by 
a focus on its own region, but also that it considers interference by external actors within its 
own region as a geopolitical challenge; in particular the propensity of Western states to interfere 
in the domestic affairs of non-Western states. This approach is, however, not presented as 
automatically anti-Western. Indeed, as noted by the Russian Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
Alexei Borodavkin, 
 
SCO does not operate to spite or suit someone. It advocates reinforcing security and 
stability, developing many-sided partnerships for the good of the peoples of our countries 
                                                 
18 The city of Osh experienced large-scale violent rioting and looting between 11 and 14 June 2011. The violence is said to have occurred along 
multiple dividing lines: ethnic, in particular in the form of ethnic Kyrgyz attacking ethnic Uzbeks; political, with groups loyal to the ousted 
President Bakiyev and opposed to the interim government seeking to create chaos ahead of a nationwide referendum on a new constitution; 
criminal, organised criminal groups sought to capitalise on the ensuing chaos for their own purposes. The resultant violence cost many lives 
and led to widespread destruction of homes, businesses and infrastructure in and around the city, which highlighted that the interim government 
was not in control of events. 
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and forming an institutional architecture of international relations based on mutual respect, 
due consideration for the interests of each other, and equal cooperation (Borodavkin, 
2008). 
 
The principle of “local” norms taking primacy in regional affairs in order to restrict 
global dynamics entering the region was also present in the SCO’s response to the global 
financial crisis in 2008/9. The need to strengthen financial and economic mechanisms of 
regional cooperation has been outlined annually during the SCO Summits since 2009. As noted 
by the Chinese President Hu Jintao in June 2012 “[w]e should build the SCO into a driving 
force to boost regional economic development” (Xinhuanet, 2012). The subsequent proposals 
for the “establishment of a development bank, food security cooperation mechanism, energy 
club and seed banks, and for the promotion of trade and investment facilitation” (Xinhuanet, 
2012) were intended to support regional actors in mediating global trends seen as negatively 
impacting on the region. At the same time, the SCO has sought to highlight that it considers 
wider international cooperation on this issue as imperative,19 as well as maintaining a specific 
regional approach aimed at shielding the region from adverse trends beyond it. 
Similarly, discussions over the role of the SCO in Afghanistan, following the US and 
ISAF-planned withdrawal by 2014, reflect this focus on regional identity construction and 
policy-making, rather than anti-NATO and anti-Western posturing and balancing. The SCO has 
suggested that Afghanistan should be addressed within a regional orbit, and that the SCO as a 
regionally-focused actor should play a role to this end. As noted by the Chinese Foreign 
Ministry Spokesman Liu Weimin,  
 
Afghanistan borders others SCO members. The country’s development will be closely 
linked to security and stability in the region. The fact that Afghanistan has become an 
observer member of the SCO will speed up security and cooperation (CNTV, 2012).  
 
In 2009, the SCO hosted a conference on Afghanistan and in 2012 granted Afghanistan observer 
status within the organization. This further indicates that the issue of Afghanistan and the SCO’s 
response to it should be read primarily as part of the SCO’s regional remit, rather than as an 
attempt to build an anti-Western in-group.  
                                                 
19 The 2009 SCO summit declaration noted that “the current situation in the global economic and financial sector points to the need to increase 
cooperation of the international community in the field of controlling and managing international finances, making joint efforts to prevent the 
growth and spread of financial crisis risks, maintaining economic stability” (Yekaterinburg Declaration of the Heads of the Member States of 
the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, 2009).  
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Hence, elements of the SCO’s geopolitical discourse emphasize that its central focus is 
on its Self, and specifically addressing the manifest security challenges within the Eurasian 
region, rather than countering West. However, the West is often framed within this discourse as 
an indirect Other, threatening to undermine the capacity of the SCO to focus on its Self, by 
interfering in Eurasia and restricting its capacity to develop regional norms and practices in 
response to regional challenges.  
 
Making sense of the Other: the West’s role in world and the protection of the regional from the 
global 
 
In connection with the strands that promote itself as a self-referential regional actor, a key 
feature of the SCO’s geopolitical discourse is the significance of local norms and the need to 
recognize and accept that the international system is made up of different normative contexts. 
In accordance with its promotion of the principle of non-interference in domestic affairs and a 
multipolar world, the SCO advocates a greater place for regional diversity of norms within the 
international system. It is argued that in Eurasia, it should be the SCO member states setting the 
norms of behavior as the actors with the most knowledge, experience and resources to do so. In 
this way, the 2011 Astana summit declaration notes that by taking a “path towards deepening 
good-neighborly, friendly and partner relations in the region” with the formation of SCO. Hence, 
it has “set a good example for the international community in the cause of achieving pragmatic 
and important result in the field of common development” (Astana Declaration of the 10th 
Anniversary of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, 2011).   
Within this recognition that multiple norms exist in the international system, the member 
states of the SCO consider that certain particular norms and values should form the basis of 
international relations. Whilst certain declarations and statements issued by the SCO contain 
criticism of the behavior of the West, and US in particular, these are also usually framed 
according to the commonly perceived normative standpoint developed within the SCO in-group. 
The common values and norms which underpin the SCO are termed the “Shanghai spirit”, 
which puts the principle of non-interference in domestic affairs at the heart of the SCO. In 
connection with its emphasis on protecting the region from outside interference, the SCO 
champions the principles underlying the “Shanghai spirit” at an international level. Thus it 
advocates the centrality of “Westphalian” principles – as opposed to the post-Westphalian - of 
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international relations that places state sovereignty and territorial integrity as the cornerstones 
of the international system.20 
 The SCO’s declarations on international affairs and geopolitics thus, for the most part, 
reflect the views and values articulated within other aspects of the SCO. In this way, the 
membership of the SCO would prefer to see some of their commonly held values and positions 
at the center of the international system, in place of or alongside what its elites perceive as 
certain “Western” inspired norms. In this respect, Shaimergenov and Tusupbaeva declare that, 
 
when analyzing the results of the Organization’s summits, as well as statements made in 
the format of bilateral meetings of the member state leaders, the following program theses 
can be seen in them: the absence of any intention to build another military bloc; the 
striving to reduce unilateralism in international relations; the rejection of a hegemonic 
policy; and non-acceptance of unipolarity (Shaimergenov and Tusupbaeva, 2006). 
 
In turn however, because many of the norms that the West promotes globally appear to 
clash with the norms that have been developed within the SCO, the West is often presented as 
harmful to the stability and security of this in-group (Ambrosio, 2009). Whereas most political 
actors in the West argue that it is the duty of national governments to protect human security 
across the world, and this duty can override the principle of state sovereignty, the member states 
of the SCO often express reservations about this position and emphasize that within the aim of 
promoting stability in global security that the principle of state sovereignty remains paramount. 
For example, in 2011 the “[SCO] heads of state noted that internal conflicts and crises must be 
resolved solely through peaceful means, through a political dialogue, whereas the international 
community must act in the direction of facilitating the processes of national reconciliation on 
the basis of strict observance of the international law, full respect for independence, sovereignty 
and territorial integrity, as well as upholding the principle of non-interference in internal affairs 
of all states” (Astana Declaration of the 10th Anniversary of the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization, 2011).  
The perceived need to assert this perspective strongly, especially with regard to Western 
actions in Eurasia, grew after the period of the “color revolutions” in the mid-2000s, which 
were interpreted by the leaderships of the SCO members as a threat to their regimes and regional 
                                                 
20 The SCO Summit declaration (2006) stated that the “SCO owes its smooth growth to its consistent adherence to the "Shanghai Spirit" of 
"mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality, consultation, respect for multi-civilizations and pursuit of common development". This spirit is the 
underlying philosophy and the most important code of conduct of SCO. It enriches the theory and practice of contemporary international 
relations and embodies the shared aspiration of the international community for realizing democracy in international relations. The "Shanghai 
Spirit" is therefore of critical importance to the international community's pursuit of a new and non-confrontational model of international 
relations, a model that calls for discarding the Cold War mentality and transcending ideological differences”. 
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stability (Aris, 2011; Wilson, 2010; Allison, 2008; Ambrosio, 2008). This attitude was hardened 
by the widespread perception within Eurasia that Western actors, and specifically US 
government-supported NGOs, actively worked to provoke these “color revolutions” (Ortmann 
and Heathershaw, 2012; Wilson, 2010). Against this background, Western promotion of the 
need to override national sovereignty to the end of protecting individuals is largely read as a 
way of justifying actions sponsoring regime change to the advantage of Western governments.  
At an international level, NATO’s intervention in Kosovo in 1999 and the US-led 
coalition’s military operation in Iraq in 2003 were perceived by the leaderships of the SCO’s 
member states as undermining the prevailing norms of practice in international relations and 
generated significant misgivings about the changing normative landscape in the international 
system.21 The two side’s reaction to the Arab Spring has further highlighted this normative 
difference. The SCO and its member states, particularly Russia and China, have continued to 
support the principle of non-interference in the Middle East and have been criticized by the 
West for doing so. As noted in the 2011 Astana summit declaration, “they [the SCO] oppose 
armed intervention or forced “regime change” and disapprove of unilateral sanctions” (Astana 
Declaration of the 10th Anniversary of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, 2011). 
Similarly on the question of Iran and nuclear proliferation, the SCO’s promotion of the benefits 
of multipolarity are evident within the continued advocacy of the central role of the United 
Nations (UN) in standing against what is perceived as an aggressive and confrontational policy 
of the US. At the Beijing summit in 2012 it was outlined that the SCO 
 
regard any attempt to resolve the Iranian issue by force is unacceptable as such attempts 
will produce unpredictable and serious consequences threatening the stability of the 
region and the world…They support the P5 plus one and Iran in opening sustainable 
dialogue process and they support efforts to find political and diplomatic solution to the 
Iranian nuclear issue through dialogue (Declaration of the Heads of State of the Member 
States of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization on Building a Region of Lasting Peace 
and Common Prosperity, 2012). 
 
Thus, in international affairs the SCO and the West often emerge on different sides of 
global debates, particularly on issues of security and the role of the international community 
and international actors in local affairs. Within these geopolitical discourses, the West is 
                                                 
21 For a detailed account of the member states’ and the SCO’s interpretation of the “colour revolutions” as an extra-regionally inspired threat 
to prevailing regional norms and regime security see (Ambrosio, 2009, pp.166-7). 
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depicted, if not as an antagonistic Other, then as a very different Other, with little similarity to 
the SCO in-group. 
Furthermore, within such geopolitical discourses, the image of the West is at times also 
conflated with a hegemonic “global” discourse. This “global” discourse is seen as laying down 
the norms of behavior for the international system, and is seen as opposing the norms advocated 
by the SCO. The leaderships of the SCO’s member states, especially Russia and China, view 
the West as applying double standards in their expectations of them, compared to their own 
behavior.  At the SCO annual summit in 2006, it was stated that 
 
it [SCO] discards "double standards" ….. Diversity of cultures and model of development 
must be respected and upheld. Differences in cultural traditions, political and social 
systems, values and model of development formed in the course of history should not be 
taken as pretexts to interfere in other countries’ internal affairs. Model of social 
development should not be "exported” (Declaration on the Fifth Anniversary of the 
Shanghai Cooperation Organization, 2006). 
 
In the same context, the SCO member states, especially Russia and China, have been 
critical of many Western states’ recognition of Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence 
from Serbia in February 2008, and none of its members have since recognized its independent 
status. Here again, the principle of non-interference in domestic affairs is promoted as the 
bedrock of the international system. In response to certain Western discourses advocating active 
involvement in the development of democratic systems and practices in other states, the former 
Secretary-General of the SCO Secretariat stated that “the process of democratic reforms is an 
internal business of each state and it is not possible to introduce these reforms from outside” 
(Zhang, 2006).  
The SCO’s elites view a combination of globalization and the aggressive promotion of 
Western values as threatening the capacity of states with a specific culture and values to 
maintain their unique historical identity. Concerns have particularly been raised about the 
West’s use of soft power and primarily the internet and media. Two Tajik analysts argue that 
“until recently it was believed that security threats were limited to armed aggression. Today 
everything has changed: subversive information is spread through the Internet and there is 
information on “the ancient and unique culture” of this or that nation designed to fan 
nationalism” (Dodikhudoev and Niyatbekov, 2009). A common declaration at the 2010 SCO 
summit noted that “information security is closely linked with ensuring the state sovereignty, 
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national security, social and economic stability and interests of citizens. All countries have the 
right, in accordance with their internal realities and on the legal basis, to operate the Internet, 
while enhancing cooperation in the spirit of equality and mutual respect” (Declaration of the 
Tenth Meeting of the Council of the Heads of the Member States of the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization, 2010). This is again linked to the reaction of Eurasian elites to the “color 
revolutions” and the subsequent widening of the scope of the SCO’s focus on state and regime 
security from the “three evils” to a much wider array of dynamics and trends. In relation to the 
SCO’s depiction of the West, it has been influenced by the view that the West actively seeks to 
manipulate domestic political developments via the use of so called “political technologies”, 
such as NGOs and activist websites. 
Hence, at an international level, the SCO’s geopolitical discourses are often framed in 
counterpoint to what is considered the Western-driven macro-discourse that pervades the 
current international system. These juxtapositions center on what the SCO discourse outlines 
as the attempts by the West to universalize their own values and sense of Self. This is often 
contrasted with the SCO’s discourse that emphasizes the importance of the diversity of identity 
and values in the international system, and the right to protect this regional identity and its 
prevailing norms and practices from outside interference.  
 
Making sense of the Other: the West’s role in Eurasia 
 
In accordance with the SCO’s geopolitical stance on wider international affairs, the perceived 
role of the West in the SCO’s own region has caused considerable tension and had a negative 
impact on the way in which the SCO perceives its relationship with the West. In connection 
with its activities within Eurasia, the SCO presents the West largely as an antagonistic Other, 
and as an agent advocating norms and practice that undermine the common positions and views 
established among the SCO in-group.  
A key issue is the view that the West does not take into account the prevailing security 
or political context within Eurasia. In this respect, a Chinese official states that “certain Western 
countries, without taking into account concrete specific features of Central Asian states, 
consider ‘democratic transformations’ to be the main aim of their relations with the region, and 
even encourage ‘color revolutions’ in an attempt to broaden their political and military 
influence, which leads to greater instability in the region’” (Cited in Portyakov, 2008, p.162). 
The leaderships of the SCO’s member states consider that within the existing Western-
inspired normative landscape there is no room for recognition of regional identity and values. 
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Instead, the Western inspired model of liberal-democracy is pushed upon them regardless of 
circumstances. The former Secretary-General of the SCO highlighted this viewpoint, stating 
that, 
 
democracy is a good thing, but its exercise in practice depends on the concrete situation 
on the ground in each region and each country. It is unacceptable to apply absolutely the 
same approach everywhere and inadmissible to transplant democracy by force, thus 
bestowing a doubtful benefit upon someone (Zhang, 2005). 
 
Against this background, the member states’ regimes consider the SCO as an important 
supporter of their domestic security policies, which attract criticism in the West. In this way, 
not only is the West presented as a negative Other, but the Self is presented as a necessary in-
group in order to protect the domestic interests of its member-states. The principle of non-
intervention in domestic affairs underpins the faith of its member states that the SCO as an in-
group is a reliable mechanism in defense of their regimes. Ambrosio (2009, p. 174) argues that 
“a key component of the [SCO] defense of diversity is the argument that it is illegitimate for 
outsiders to ‘impose’ their version of democracy on anyone else”. On this basis, the SCO is 
recognized as a mechanism for creating a preferable normative environment, in which the 
principle of non-interference in domestic affairs remains paramount. Thus, the SCO attempts to 
promote its intra-organizational norms and perceptions in its geopolitical discourse, with the 
aim of ensuring sufficient space for the Central Asian Republics to pursue their domestic 
security policies without the prospect of Western intervention and condemnation (Allison, 2008, 
pp. 186-8).  
 In this respect, the events of the “color revolutions” and Western reaction to the Andijan 
incident in 2005, had a significant impact on the interpretations of regional officials and analysts 
about the Western vision for the region. Following condemnation by the Western community 
of the Uzbek government for suppressing an uprising within is Andijan province, SCO included 
the following paragraph in its annual common declaration, which stated, 
 
Taking into account the completion of the active combat phase of the antiterrorist 
operation in Afghanistan, the SCO member-states consider it necessary that the relevant 
members of the antiterrorist coalition take a decision on the deadlines for the temporary 
use of the abovementioned infrastructure facilities and military presence on the territory 
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of the SCO member-states (Declaration of Heads of Member States of Shanghai 
Cooperation Organization, 2005) 
This was interpreted as a direct message of communication to the West not to interfere in the 
SCO member-states’ domestic affairs, and hence was expressed along a clear antagonistic Self-
Other dynamic, whereby the Other violated the identity of the Self by trying to interfere within 
the in-group of the SCO member-states. This perspective comes against the background of 
increasing discomfort with the, potentially long-term, presence of US military bases in the 
region, which are viewed by Moscow and Beijing as a threat to both their security and influence 
in the region (Cooley, 2012; Deyermond, 2009). After endorsing the establishment of these 
bases, as part of the 2001 US led operation to remove the Taliban from power in Afghanistan 
and destroy Al-Qaeda, both Russia and China have become increasingly concerned about the 
continued US military presence in Eurasia following the completion of the initial operation in 
Afghanistan.  
A challenge to the coherence of the SCO’s principle of non-interference occurred as a 
result of Russia’s actions and military posturing in the Russia-Georgia war in 2008. Moscow 
requested the other member states come out in support of its military action in Georgia, even 
though this appeared to be in contradiction with the principle of non-interference in domestic 
affairs (Swanstrom, 2008). Hence, the other members of the SCO were faced with a difficult 
situation, whereby they were being asked to undermine the primary principle of the organization 
because “one of its members’ exercised the same ‘double standards’, for which it criticizes the 
West” (Aris, 2011, p. 145). In a rather pragmatic response, the SCO sought to sweep this issue 
under the carpet by not issuing a statement of support, but outlining in its 2008 Summit 
declaration that it acknowledged Russia’s key role in maintaining peace in this region. The 
statement also reaffirmed its commitment to its non-interference doctrine. In addition, no other 
SCO member followed Russia in recognizing South Ossetia and Abkhazia as sovereign states.  
The SCO has sought to reassert the centrality of “non-interference” within the SCO’s 
geopolitical identity in the wake of the Russian-Georgia war, and indeed the legacy of this 
challenge to its geopolitical credibility was to some degree evident when these principles were 
articulated again during the Osh riots in Kyrgyzstan in 2010 (Aris, 2011, p. 471). In spite of a 
request for external assistance from the President of the interim Kyrgyz government, the SCO 
choose not to intervene. An SCO statement outlined that “in the light of developments in the 
Kyrgyz Republic, Member States reaffirm the principled position of mutual support of state 
sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity”, noting that “they [SCO] oppose the 
interference in the internal affairs of sovereign states, as well as actions that could cause 
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tensions in the region, and support the resolution of any disagreements exclusively by political 
and diplomatic means, through dialogue and negotiation” (Declaration of the Tenth Meeting of 
the Council of the Heads of the Member States of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, 
2010). 
However, in all likelihood, the decision not to intervene in Kyrgyzstan was the product 
of a variety of geopolitical considerations not directly associated to the principle of non-
interference. An important factor was Russia’s concern “about the true allegiances of the interim 
government once its power is consolidated” (Bond and Koch, 2010, p. 551). As was Tashkent’s 
reluctance to play a role in bringing security to Osh in spite of its proximity to the Uzbek border 
and the suffering of the ethnic Uzbek minority in Osh, because “Uzbekistan’s elite-level 
wariness of the Uzbek diaspora, as evidenced by the general reluctance to accept refugees and 
efforts to close the border as quickly as possible” (Bond and Koch, 2010, p. 555). Indeed, it has 
been argued that “the events [the Osh riots in June 2010] have in fact exposed significant 
divisions among member states” (Bond and Koch, 2010, p. 553) and illustrated that the SCO 
has “no capacity for rapid reaction to such events, and the individual responses of its member 
states would suggest it is unable to call upon the political will of its members to form a common 
force” (Aris, 2012, p.471).  
Nonetheless, in line with its wider geopolitical narrative, as illustrated by the statement 
above, the SCO sought to frame its non-intervention in Osh as due to its well-stated position of 
non-interference in domestic affairs. The placing of the principle of non-interference at the heart 
of the SCO’s geopolitical identity in itself applies certain limitations on its ability to serve as 
an effective regional security actor, at least in terms of responding to security crises. This is 
because “the ‘non-intervention’ principle that is used to define the SCO, and the position and 
role it plays as a security guarantor for state and regime security, make the normative landscape 
to intervene in domestic affairs very limited” (Aris, 2012, p.471). Thus, the SCO’s emphasis on 
the principle of non-interference in domestic affairs as the cornerstone of its geopolitical 
identity seems to be driven by its members' leaderships' fear of active intervention by external 
actors in their domestic affairs. As well as a reaction against international condemnation and 
punishment for their domestic policies aimed at regime security. 
The SCO’s geopolitical discourse with regard to Eurasia constructs the West as an 
antagonistic Other. This depiction is informed by the SCO’s negative reading of the West’s role 
in global affairs. The West is considered to be an actor that seeks to universalize its own norms 
and undermine and breech what the SCO sees as crucial principles of sovereignty, non-
interference in local (domestic or regional) affairs. As a consequence, it is also said to challenge 
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the importance of local/regional contexts in regional and international governance. However, 
while at times, this is constructed as different interpretations of the principles of sovereignty 
and intervention in the international system, as soon as this touches on a regional issue, or a 
SCO member, then the West becomes a direct antagonistic Other, read as a threat to the 
Westphalian basis of its member states. 
 
Potential avenues for cooperation with the West 
 
Within its official geopolitical discourse, the SCO argues that the world is becoming 
increasingly multipolar and fluid in its makeup. The 2012 Beijing summit declarations states 
that “the heads of state noted the on-going complex changes in the international system since 
the beginning of the 21st century, featuring an increasingly multi-polar landscape, stronger 
regional coordination, deepening globalization, closer interdependence between countries and 
a larger role for information technologies” (Declaration of the Heads of State of the Member 
States of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization on Building a Region of Lasting Peace and 
Common Prosperity, 2012). As part of this viewpoint, and in spite of the many antagonisms in 
its relationship with the West on other issues, the SCO suggests that both sides are experiencing 
similar types of threats or face similar sources of tension to their security governance. The same 
declaration outlined that “it is imperative for the international community to meet global 
challenges through effective and concerted actions”. In this respect, it is acknowledged within 
the SCO’s geopolitical discourse that cooperation with the West focused on specific issues is 
potentially possible and advantageous.    
The most prominent area in which the SCO has depicted the West as an actor with a 
similar identity to itself has been the SCO’s attempt to inscribe itself within the international 
coalition against terrorism or “War on Terror”, as part of its concerns with the “three evils”. To 
this end, the SCO emphasized the commonality between Eurasian regional challenges and 
international ones, and its contribution to international approaches for dealing with such 
challenges 
 
SCO member states, recognizing the transnational nature of today’s terrorism and being 
in the forefront of the fight against its practical manifestations, are following a course of 
mutual cooperation and vigorous participation in the efforts of the world community in 
the struggle against terrorism, in particular, in stopping its financing channels. In this 
matter they assign an important role to close collaboration between the law enforcement 
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agencies and secret services, and also the defense agencies of the SCO member states 
(Moscow Declaration of Heads of Member States of Shanghai Cooperation Organization, 
2003). 
 
However, this geopolitical discourse is not one based on a simplistic identification of 
similarity and commonality with the West. The SCO’s approach to tackling the “three evils” 
simultaneously likened itself to and distinguishes itself from the global “War on Terror”. It 
focuses on the one hand on “coordinating their actions with the US in combating international 
terrorism”. While, at the same time continuing to “act according to their own programs and in 
their own interests, closely linking this struggle with counteraction to separatism and Islamic 
extremism” (Lukin, 2007, p.142). Nonetheless, its discourse on this issue signaled an effort by 
the SCO to define its identity as similar to, and in coordination with the West 
Aside from the discourse on the war on terror, the issue of Afghanistan and wider re-
gional security is another area identified as one of agreement and similarity, if not collaboration, 
between the SCO and the West. Notably, the SCO-hosted Conference on Afghanistan in 2009 
included not only participants and representative from the region, but also international and 
Western actors - the first time US, European and NATO officials have been invited to a SCO 
gathering. Whilst, as noted above, the question of Afghanistan and regional security is often 
presented by the SCO as part of its regional policy and internal concerns,22 it is considered a 
global concern for the international community, and therefore that it could form part of a col-
laborative effort with the West. The 2012 Beijing summit declaration outlined that while “they 
are of the view that the national reconciliation process in Afghanistan should be Afghan-led 
and Afghan-owned”, “the member states support the United Nations” leading role in coordinat-
ing the international efforts on the issue of Afghanistan (Declaration of the Heads of State of 
the Member States of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization on Building a Region of Lasting 
Peace and Common Prosperity, 2012). And as outlined in a SCO-Afghanistan joint statement 
following the 2009 conference, the SCO sets out an interest in collaboration with the West and 
wider international community, detailing an aim of “supporting the efforts of the Afghan Gov-
ernment and International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan (ISAF) to improve law 
enforcement and combat the production and trafficking of narcotic drugs and curtailing the flow 
of precursors more effectively” (Statement by the Shanghai Cooperation Organization Member 
                                                 
22 The 2011 Astana summit noted that “The member states stated that the unresolved situation in Afghanistan coupled with the continuing 
tension and confrontation in the country remains one of the key sources of threats to the regional security and stability” (“Joint Communiqué 
of meeting of the Council of the Heads of the Member States of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation commemorating the 10th anniversary 
of the SCO”, June 15, 2011 [http://www.sectsco.org/EN/show.asp?id=293] accessed July 23, 2012. 
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States and the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan on combating terrorism, illicit drug trafficking 
and organized crime, 2012). The SCO is particularly interested in collaboration on counter-
narcotics  programs and operations as this is considered a major security challenge to several 
of its member states. However, the lack of reciprocation from NATO, which deems this issue 
as of a lower priority, has caused frustration among its members. 
Furthermore, as it becomes more focused on an outward geopolitical role within inter-
national affairs, the SCO’s geopolitical discourse is increasingly moving beyond a Self-Other 
dynamic based on the West, and towards a focus on other actors within international relations. 
As part of the SCO’s geopolitical discourse that asserts that the international system is increas-
ingly multipolar and interdependent, the SCO has highlighted the need for it to build up a 
broader coalition or in-group with other global and regional players. This has manifested itself 
in establishing diplomatic connections and partnerships with other multilateral institutions and 
structures, as seen in the signing of the cooperation agreement between the SCO and the UN in 
December 2009 (Joint Declaration on SCO/UN Secretariat Cooperation, 2010). The SCO has 
established agreements and partner links with the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), 
Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEC), 
ASEAN, Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP) and Economic 
Cooperation Organization (ECO). Indeed as noted in the Astana summit declaration in 2011: 
 
The heads of state note with satisfaction that in the past 10 years since the founding of 
the SCO, the Organization has become an important element of the fledgling network of 
multilateral association in the Asia Pacific region (Astana Declaration of the 10th 
Anniversary of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, 2011). 
 
This approach is akin to the concept of network diplomacy, and is centered on a greater flexi-
bility and pragmatism than is allowed for in traditional fixed forms of geopolitical coalitions 
and in which the Self-Other dynamic is highly malleable. These partnerships and networks have 
become an increasingly key part of the SCO’s geopolitical discourse, lessening the significance 
of its relationship with the West for defining its spatial and normative identity within the inter-
national system. As this process develops, it is likely that the centrality of the West to the SCO’s 
geopolitical identity constructions will in fact decline further. This perhaps reflects a wider 
geopolitical reorientation of space and identities within the international system, in which view-
ing all aspects of geopolitics through the perspective of the West, as the hegemonic center-
point, becomes outmoded, or at least not the only relevant vantage point.   
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In spite of tensions over the norms that shape and drive contemporary international 
relations, and criticism of what it envisions as the West’s antagonistic interference in Eurasia, 
the SCO’s geopolitical discourse has also identified some areas of common interest and grounds 
for collaboration between the Self and the Other. This includes the potential for the creation of 
an ad-hoc temporary macro in-group with the West, on certain issues area and certain spaces. 
In addition, the SCO is actively seeking to develop relationships with a range of other non-
Western actors, and these alternative Self-Other dynamics are increasingly becoming more 
important to the SCO. In this way, its definition of itself in relation to the West will become a 
less significant factor, and will open space for it to develop a wider range of geopolitical space 





As the tracing of its geopolitical discourse has demonstrated, the SCO’s identity is not 
constructed on the basis of a single identity and discourse between the Self (the SCO) and the 
Other (the West). While acknowledging that the SCO is far from a coherent amalgamation of 
its member states’ views on the world and faces a number of practical challenges in enacting 
its rhetoric, this article has argued that the SCO’s geopolitical discourse and constructs of its 
Self/Other relations are composed of three broad types: the discourse on the Self from within 
(collective identity); the Other as similar/different; and the Other as an opposite.  
From this perspective, it is asserted that contrary to many depictions of the SCO as 
centered on a binary identity construction of countering the West, multi-faceted and fluid 
identity constructions are evident within the SCO’s geopolitical discourses. The nature of the 
Self-Other dynamic vis-à-vis the West varies across spatial, issue and temporal contexts. Thus, 
on many issues and within many spaces, the SCO’s geopolitical discourse on both international 
and regional affairs is indeed built upon a Self-Other dynamic that contrasts their common 
positions on certain international issues against those of the West. The most antagonistic 
interpretation of the West as an Other emerges in contexts in which the West is seen as directly 
challenging the collective identity of the SCO as an in-group, in terms of interference in the 
Eurasian space towards the end of influencing, or altering, internal affairs. A slightly more 
benign depiction of the West as a different Other can be found on issues within the global space 
that do not directly touch on the SCO’s identity as an in-group, in particular on issues that most 
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obviously point to a degree of common interest such as in the case of counter narcotics programs 
in Afghanistan.  
However, on other issues in other contexts, the SCO’s geopolitical discourse notes 
similarity to the West and is aimed at building a larger in-group between itself and the West, 
primarily with regard to international terrorism and the future stability of Afghanistan. On this 
basis, it is suggested that the SCO’s geopolitical discourse on international/regional affairs 
functions to construct its identity as a limited in-group, which both rejects and seeks to work 
together with their perceived significant Other (the West).  
Within this geopolitical imaginary, the SCO seeks to close, or limit, the space available 
to the West within what it considers its own regional jurisdiction and at the same time assert its 
ownership, and identity in terms, of the Eurasian space. Beyond the immediate Eurasian space, 
the SCO also seeks to close space to the West and open space for itself on certain issues of 
global norms and standards, but on other issues also seeks to open space for the West, and 
specifically for collaboration with the West, most notably over Afghanistan and the War on 
Terror.  
As highlighted in the analytical framework section, there is a tendency to dismiss 
collective identity building in most non-Western regional organizations that is not based on 
juxtaposition to the West, as part of the Western-centric focus on a “traditional” geopolitical 
perspective. However, as argued above, collective identity building processes centered on 
regional concerns and considerations form a central part of the SCO’s geopolitical discourse 
and identity building narratives. Therefore, the SCOs collective identity building and 
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